The Philosophy Department
Subject: Epistemology, Metaphysics and Metaethics.
Abstract: Realist rationalists about the abstract hold that (at least some) objects we come to know about are mind-independent abstract objects and that the source of knowledge about such objects is not sensory but rather intellectual. However, proponents of this view confront a significant challenge. Abstract objects, by their nature, lack causal powers – they cannot affect us (or anything else) causally. This raises a concern regarding our ability to know about them – since knowledge is typically understood as requiring a connection between the subject and the known object – rather than coming to believe the truth about them by mere chance. In recent years, a solution to this problem has been proposed by appealing to the notion of constitution. By analogy to naïve realism about perception – a view according to which the non-abstract objects we non-accidentally successfully perceive are constitutive of our experience of them – it is argued that the abstract objects we non-accidentally successfully intuit are constitutive of our intuitions of them; thus, allowing these intuitions to serve as a source of knowledge. One of the motivations for accepting this proposed view – naïve realism about intuition – lies in its analogy with the independently-advocated view, naïve realism about perception. However, my aim is to argue that the relation between the two views might be even stronger than a mere analogy. Relying on the metaphysical commitments of naïve realists about intuition, I argue that the two views share a commitment: according to them, both non-accidentally successful perceptions and intuitions share a necessary type of constituent. This type of constituent is of an abstract nature: a relation; or, more specifically, the instantiation relation. If what I argue holds, this shared type of constituent creates a deep entanglement of the two views, which, in turn, blurs the line between perceptual and intellectual experiences of the world as well as the distinction between the objects to which each pertains, and their ability to serve as sources of knowledge. Additionally, this deep entanglement serves as further support for naïve realism about intuition, as it is deeply tied to an independently-motivated view. In my theses, I aim to examine the possible defense such a view can offer to non-naturalistic realist metaethical views – views according to which moral facts are objective, mind-independent, irreducible to natural facts and, therefore, lack causal powers. Since views of this kind face an epistemic challenge similar to the epistemic challenge to our knowledge of abstract objects, I believe that applying my view to this epistemic challenge can illuminate contemporary debates in metaethics in a new light and offer a new type of an independently-motivated defense of moral realism.
MA Honors 2024/25