Department of Philosophy
Subject: Emotional Knowledge: Emotions' Epistemic Role
Supervisor: Prof. David Enoch and Prof. Hagit Benbaji
Abstract:The main question that underlies the dissertation is the following: do emotions have an epistemic role? The rationale behind the positive answer that I provide is the following. An answer to whether emotions have an epistemic role depends in part on what emotions are. Thus, we need an account of the kind of mental state that emotions are, or at the very least an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state being an emotion. In addition, an answer to the question about emotions’ epistemic role must take into consideration that characteristics of emotions may pose limitations on their epistemic role. The five chapters of this dissertation try to do exactly that: provide an account of emotions’ indispensable epistemic role, an account that satisfies the constraints that arise from considering what emotions are. The thesis that arises from the dissertation is that emotions are sui generis mental states, essentially evaluable and felt, that conceptually represent and present affective-evaluative properties. They are the basic way we experience and think about affective-evaluative properties, and they fix the reference of the concepts of these properties. Emotions are defeasibly entitled, can be justified by evaluative evidence and defeasibly justify beliefs in virtue of being evidence of evidence. Although their epistemic role is limited in some cases, they are nonetheless epistemically indispensable.
Bio:
I have a BA in Psychology and Philosophy from the Hebrew University, an MA in Clinical Psychology and a PhD in Philosophy.
My dissertation is related to one of the central aspects of our daily lives and of psychotherapy - emotions. Specifically, I argue that emotions are an independent source of knowledge. For example, my fear can be an independent way for me to know that there is something dangerous in my vicinity or my shame can be a way for me coming to know that I had done something wrong. This will seem natural to many people. Psychotherapists surely think that their patients' emotions and their own emotions are a way of discovering a world of psychic meaning. However, is has proven to be quite difficult to offer an account of emotions and their epistemic role that withstands philosophical scrutiny. In my dissertation I hope to have succeed in doing so, while remaining true to the phenomenology of emotions.
Apart from my philosophical research, I am a certified clinical psychologist and conduct therapy with children, adolescents and adults. In addition, I am engaged in theoretical thinking about clinical psychology from a psychoanalytic perspective, mainly Freudian and Kleinian.
Publications:
R. Pat-Horenczyk, A.M. Kenan. M. Achitvu, E. Bachar. (2014). Protective Factors Based Model for Screening for Posttraumatic Distress in Adolescents. Child and Youth Care Forum, 43 (3), 339-351. DOI: 10.1007/s10566-013-9241-y.
Presidential Stipend 2016/17