Department of Philosophy
Subject: Metaethics and Epistemology.
Advisor: Prof. David Enoch
Abstract: In my current research in epistemology and meta-ethics, I propose to understand the epistemological challenge to Robust Moral Realism differently than it is typically formulated in the literature. I believe the most popular formulation of this challenge, which I call “The Correlation Challenge” is based on problematic assumptions. Presented by David Enoch (2010), The Correlation Challenge requires the moral realist to explain the correlation between our moral judgments and the moral truths. That is, we hold many true moral judgments, such as that stealing or humiliating is wrong, but it is unclear how that is the case. According to moral realism, moral facts are, on one hand, causally inert, and on the other hand, mind-independent. Therefore, it seems they are "disconnected" from us in a way that prevents us to access them. Opponents of moral realism argue therefore that this position leads to moral skepticism. Despite this, I argue that the challenge is not sufficiently clear. For example, it is not specified which correlation exactly calls for explanation: is it the correlation encompassing all our moral judgments, or only a selected group of moral judgments? I argue that any possible answer to this question bases the challenge on highly problematic assumptions. Therefore, I propose moving to a new formulation – the “Individual Challenge”. This challenge bypasses previous concerns by presenting a separate epistemological challenge for each moral judgment. For instance, a moral realist believes that stealing is wrong, but what explains the correspondence between the development of this particular judgment and its being true? Without an explanation, the realist would have to admit that it is a coincidental match, undermining the justification for this judgment. The new challenge not only contributes to the understanding of the epistemological challenge and clarifies it, but it also has significant philosophical implications. Changing the challenge also leads to changes in the solutions that the moral realist can propose and in the objections to existing solutions. This discussion is highly significant for moral realism, as this challenge is considered by many to be the most significant challenge against this position.
MA Honors 2024/25